Cooperative game theory instruments application to the corporate finance M&A research issues provide an ability to extend the field considered and conclusions obtained. The paper presents the M&A cooperative games modeling and its empirical implementation to analyze the airline strategic alliance as M&A deal.
Introduction
Cooperative behavior of economic agents is becoming particularly relevant in the context of globalization and information exchange streamlining. Amalgamate entities pursue the goals of strengthening their market position and influence whether it's a mutual cooperation or hostile takeover. Coalitions formation between the firms can lead both to the establishment of monopoly power through consolidation, and to products and services quality improvement and/or price decreasing by, for example, implementation of partner design and innovation.
Here we present cooperative game theory approach implementation to the M&A analysis field which is under corporate finance theory mainstream currently. The first benefit of this method is an ability to research not only mergers and acquisitions but also preliminary collaboration stage of strategic cooperation which doesn't mean the termination of any company. Secondly it involves an ability to consider more than just two firms as in traditional research practice.
Furthermore it gives an opportunity to achieve more complex deal scan to facilitate the decision making process. Economic agents decision whether to merge or not is commonly synergy verifying. If analysts indicate the synergy positiveness they may conclude the deal expediency. Game theory methodology applying provides us an opportunity to investigate deal stability, deal fear value and to define companies fear values more precisely.
Mergers and acquisitions cooperative games
The current practice of analyzing the effectiveness of the strategic cooperation between the two companies does not involve the use of conventional instruments of analysis, due to the contractual basis of the behavior of the coalition. Meanwhile, due to coalition behavior affects the companies' fair price value such a methodology becomes necessary, especially when the strategic alliance includes more than two airlines. Analysis of effectiveness of mergers and acquisitions between companies in the corporate finance theory is dedicated to the same issue. It should be mentioned that such verification is to consider only the two coordinating companies.
This work proposes a solution to this problem through the use of cooperative game theory, which will expand both the range of application and the conclusions of analysis of economic integration on the corporate finance theory's results basis.
In international practice the difference between the terms of merger and acquisition is that these two phenomenons are different stages of cooperation (Whitehurst D., 2003) . However, the difference between these concepts is almost insignificant. Thus, there is no distinction between mergers and acquisitions in the M&A deal justification process with the instrumental point of view. The choice between mergers and acquisitions is based on institutional prerequisites. The corporate finance theory offers a rationale for cooperative behavior by finding positive synergies from a methodological point of view.
The essential feature here is that the appellations "merger" and "acquisition" conform to the Russian law terms. Thus, merger is an integration of two or more economic entities which produces a new unified economic unit while in the case of acquisition all target companies lose their independence and cease to exist and acquire gets all the rights and obligations of the liquidated companies. We assume here that the coalition formation cost is the amount of external services for each of the companies involved in the coalition:
This assumption may be explained by the fact that the coalition formation is quite a lengthy process and does not require the simultaneous accession of all participants. Due to this assumption this parameter is insignificant to determine the feasibility and sustainability of the overall coalition. Point is that a characteristic function, which is the sum of two superadditive ones, is also superadditive. Therefore we can simplify the characteristic function as:
In the most countries the valuation processes, i.e., the fair value estimation, is regulated by law. In the Russian Federation, such activity is regulated by the valuation standards (FSO). Thus, in accordance with the 3d FSO 1 evaluator is able to choose certain methods of estimation and justify his or her choice under cost-based, comparative and income approaches. We specify the MACG (I,v) characteristic function in accordance with the income approach.
In the current international practice the first method is not commonly used due to objective reasons. Thus, according to the cost method the company fair value equals to the value of its assets without the debt. But the net book value of a business has no bearing on the case however great it could be (Валдайцев, 2008) . 
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These indicators should be calculated for each coalition according to the form (strategic alliances, mergers and acquisitions) and the type (horizontal integration, vertical integration and conglomerate) of the companies' cooperative behavior.
The weighted average cost of capital rate in this model is calculated on the basis of the policy of available resources distribution ratio within the coalition and of the tax rate. Tax rate may vary in dependence, for instance, on whether in the coalition the company with the tax benefits right exists or on the country of common coalition residence. WACC is calculated also based on the ratio β S :
Here, D S is amount of coalition S debt, E S is its equity, tax S is corporate income tax rate, k S d is rate of return on debt, k S e is rate of return on equity, r m is market rate of return and r f risk-free rate of return.
The modern literature on the theory of corporate finance, accepted to correct the coefficient β S for certain coalition as an average coalition's beta weighted by cost of equity (Moulin, 2003) in accordance with the international global market as a result of the capital market globalization.
In special cases there is the possibility to optimize some of these indicators. In such situations relative formulas will differ in dependence of form and type of cooperative behavior. For example, in the way of different countries' residents merger a new venture may have an opportunity to choose a country for residence.
Obviously, in this case, his choice will be largely justified by the system of corporate taxation in these countries. Considering an acquisition an indicator of corporate income tax rate will match the relative tax rate of acquirer's country of residence.
There is a difference in the pattern of changes in operating and financial performance between the strategic alliance form of coalition behavior and behavior by the type of M&A. In the second case it varies by actual changes in balance sheet and all departments and parties association. In the first case we can observe the lack thereof.
Cooperation within the framework of diversification and vertical integration does not allow optimizing the structure of production Another important interpretation of the allocation vector is a fair acquisition price or fair value of exchangeable shares for the merger.
It is usually the most controversial issues in conducting such deals.
Thus, the assessment of companies that have or will undergone conversion by merger or acquisition is a key issue of financial and strategic planning.
Strategic alliance as MACG
Increasing role of these possible forms of coalition behavior can be observed, for example, in the aviation industry. In order to achieve greater efficiency in the international market competitive airlines are seeking to increase the number of routes, quality of service, reduce costs, integrating into alliances, concluding interline agreements and agreements on code-sharing. Saturation of the world airlines market leads to the need of consolidation through mergers and acquisitions. Air alliances and airlines groups are gaining importance and scope in the airline business.
In particular, aviation industry is strategically important for Russia's accession to the WTO is leading to significant changes in this industry. Thus, the possible consolidation of Russian and foreign companies analysis, withdrawal of administrative barriers, such as a limit on foreign pilots working in domestic companies, established by the Air Code, begins to play a key role in an effort to achieve economic efficiency of the international aviation industry.
In this paragraph MACG instruments application are considered relatively to strategic alliance cooperation form. The airline alliance
Oneworld will be analyzed with the using its operational and financial data provided by Thomson Reuters. Oneworld was founded in 1999 and now it is the third largest global airline alliance.
Oneworld MACG model here observe 11 out of 12 its current full members. Thus, Malaysia Airlines is excluded from the model due to its recent joining. It was included on February 1st of this year.
According to data provided, we calculated the weighted average To determine the cash flow discount rate using the above formulas we calculated firstly the values of β i for each airline i, r m and r f . The risk-free rate of return was estimated by the 15 years average monthly yield of thirty-years U.S. Treasury bonds. It is equal to 4.11%. Value of the market risk premium was calculated by the median of the differences of monthly yields of S&P 500 and the monthly yields of thirty-years Treasury bonds over 15 years (Koller T., 2005) . It is equal to 6.84%. The value β i for each country was derived as the ratio of the covariance of monthly yields of the local index and S&P 500 to the value of VaR (Damodaran, 2004 Thereby using the concepts of cooperative game theory in relation to M&A analysis offers important opportunities to interpretation and solving particularly contentious issues. In the last part of the paper the empirical model for strategic alliance cooperative form was built.
MACG analysis features were illustrated on the example of the third largest world airline alliance Oneworld.
